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A

ssessing and making items free from explosive (FFE) are among the most dangerous things
we do in mine action and are perhaps the least regulated. Mine action operators use items
that have been made FFE or INERT for training and demonstration purposes. However, the
sector does not really have sufficient procedures or qualifications to assess items as certified free
from explosive (CFFE), or to make items FFE/INERT. Assessing or making items FFE are explosive
processes and should be treated as such more consistently within the mine action sector. This
article will outline the current state of play concerning FFE items in mine action, some of the problems involved, and suggest some potential options for consideration.

The Requirement for FFE Items
The humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector uses items of
explosive ordnance (EO) that are CFFE, or INERT1 for a range
of reasons (INERT and FFE are interchangeable terms with the
same essential meaning). Foremost among these is the need to
provide items for training, not only to show students what different categories, sub-categories, and models of EO2 look like, but
also to provide items for realistic field exercises. 3 For example,
training deminers to find a specific type of mine will typically
involve some form of INERT substitute target. An anti-personnel
(AP) or anti-vehicle mine is made FFE, but as many metal components as practicable are retained.4 In this way, the item keeps the
electromagnetic signature of the mine for detection purposes but
does not pose an explosive hazard to the trainee. Substitute targets are also used throughout the day on demining sites by trained
deminers in order to calibrate and re-calibrate their detectors as
required. 5 Given that manual demining requires thousands of
staff to be trained and re-trained without immediate risk, and
that each demining site needs a substitute target for its test pit,6
the need for inert targets for demining operations is arguably substantial. While inerting items involves an “inherent risk,” 7 it could
be claimed that not inerting items and therefore not having targets
with a high degree of fidelity also poses a risk to deminers. Without
such high-fidelity substitute targets, deminers might be at greater
risk of missing mines. Sometimes deminers will neutralize, disarm, and then inert the first landmines found on a survey or clearance task and use these as test targets for calibrating detectors.
The logic behind this is that the mine will have weathered in a way
consistent with other mines on that particular site and therefore
provides a more faithful representation of what deminers need to
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detect with their Electro-Magnetic Induction equipment.8
(Specific test pieces are manufactured but they don't have
the ageing characteristics of items found on site.) FFE
items may also be required for research, such as the evaluation of new sensors for mine detection.9,10 While there have
been efforts to develop surrogates for use in lieu of FFE
items for research purposes,11-13 testing in field locations
still invariably uses items immediately available, such as
FFE mines, rather than surrogates that might need to be
imported at significant expense.
FFE items are also needed to train HMA explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) staff, not just for recognition
purposes, but also for simulated task scenarios. Such
needs mirror those of military EOD units. In the United
States, the Department of Defense requires Secretaries of
Military Departments to “provide sufficient quantities of
inert and live EO items for EOD procedures joint validation and test verification and EOD training.”14 While
surrogates made by means of 3D printing are available,15
they can be expensive and may be deliberately made to be

Figure 1. An INERT LU 211 BB 155mm projectile.
Note the clear INERT marking on the ogive.
Rigorous marking of FFE items is essential. Some
items in the sector are simply inadequately
marked with an indelible permanent marker pen.
Image courtesy of Danish EOD and Search Center.

visually distinguishable from real versions that have been made
FFE. Other uses of FFE items are perhaps less essential and include
displays of items made FFE at various mine action organizations.

Such displays may have many purposes, including as a form of
exhibit to brief visitors while doubling as a training resource. FFE
items are also used for museum displays.16

Current Risk Management of FFE in Mine Action
There are a range of documents detailing how FFE items should
be made and certified. The documents reflect the different contexts of mine action and ammunition storage and are therefore
not necessarily consistent. The current mine action guidelines on making and assessing items as FFE in mine action
are detailed in International Mine Action Standard (IMAS)
10.50, “Storage, Transportation and Handling of Explosives.”17
While not a normative reference of IMAS 10.50, International
Ammunition Technical Guideline (IATG) 06.50, “Specific
Safety Precautions (Storage and Operations),” also has pertinent detail.18 Notably, Annex F of IMAS 10.50 details some
requirements concerning the “breakdown or modification
of live mines and ammunition into inert, drill, instructional or replica items,” whilst IATGs only give guidance
on certifying those items as FFE.19 Breakdown of ammunition is detailed in IATG 07.30, “Ammunition Processing
Operations,” but not really in the context of inerting items
in order to certify them as FFE.20 This is consistent with the
old UK Joint Service Publication 482 on which much IATG
content is based.21 It might also be said that this reflects the
different needs of each respective sector. Some may argue
that mine action needs to conduct inerting procedures in
a way that is not necessary for routine ammunition storage. What is clear is that a sector that conducts inerting is
carrying significant levels of risk and accordingly should
have a high level of risk management practice as a norm.
Does mine action have sufficiently developed risk management procedures for making items FFE, let alone certifying items? It is not clear that it does. One significant
omission from IMAS 10.50 Annex F is the lack of any form
of risk assessment requirement prior to making an item
FFE. Perhaps remarkably, the whole of the current IMAS
10.50 does not include the term “risk assessment” at all.
IATGs do require a risk assessment prior to any explosive
process, including CFFE.
While IMAS 10.50 emphasizes the need for authorization procedures, Annex F often uses the word “must”
rather than “shall” when detailing requirements, which
in the IMAS entails a degree of ambiguity. These requirements include the need for full technical documentation
and the need for authority from the National Mine Action
Centre to conduct a procedure. IMAS also states that “all
authorised breakdown or modification of live mines and
ammunition into inert, drill, instructional or replica items
shall only be carried out by appropriately qualified and
authorised personnel.”22 Which personnel in mine action

are “appropriately qualified and authorized” to make items FFE, let
alone certify items? It is not clear whether there is actually a specific
qualification to inert items. The US Marines are often seen as leading on inerting undamaged and unfired EO. While they have an
exploitation course, it is not a requirement for inerting. It tends to
be done by those with the highest levels of skill and experience.23–25
IMAS 10.50 does add that only EOD Level 3+ personnel conduct
demilitarization. However, at the time when the third edition of
IMAS 10.50 was written in 2013, the EOD competencies did not
mention demilitarization or FFE at all.
The new Test and Evaluation Protocol (T&EP) 09.30,
“Conventional EOD Competency Standards,” 26 tried to provide more detail on the knowledge and skills required to at
least assess items as FFE. A new EOD 3+ module, Advanced
Explosive Theory, listed thirty-one competencies for assessing
items. Emphasis was placed on understanding in detail all energetic elements within an item of EO. Other skills listed included
use of X-ray, development and maintenance of FFE register, and
drafting of specific risk assessments for assessment and certification of FFE items. Unlike IMAS 10.50, the competencies covered
FFE assessment only, not any form of inerting or making items
FFE. At present there are no competencies that cover inerting or
demilitarization even though these are activities that do occur in
the sector. During the development of revised 2022 T&EP 09.30,
the possibility of a specific EOD 3+ module covering demilitarization competencies was raised but was ultimately rejected. If
such a module had been developed it would have been suitable
only for the most advanced EOD technicians and would have
involved technical training well beyond any other 3+ module.
A 3+ demilitarization module would last many months, rather
than just a few weeks, require strict pre-requisites for candidates,
and necessitate specialized ammunition processing facilities.
Certain commercial organizations do have detailed risk management processes for demilitarization. Fenix Insight conduct
demilitarization of a range of ordnance, notably cluster munitions and explosive submunitions, in order to assist countries to
meet their Article 3 obligations under the Convention on Cluster
Munitions.27 The nongovernmental organization (NGO) Golden
West Humanitarian Foundation (GWHF) runs a demilitarization site in Cambodia where EO, once disarmed, is harvested for
explosives that are then used for donor charges for demining activities.28–31 The risk management systems for explosive processing
for both organizations are stringent. Each process, clearly documented, is subject to formal internal approval. Managers actively
identify, manage, and own risk.
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FFE in the British Military
In the United Kingdom, military “CFFE is to be treated as
an explosives process,”32 which implicitly requires a number of
safety and risk management precautions to be observed. “Any
task involving the manufacture, assembly, repair, testing, modification, or disassembly of explosives carries with it an increased
risk of accidental initiation. It is therefore to be regarded as explosives processing and is to be carried out in a facility suitable for
explosives processing.”33 In accordance with Army Command
Standing Order 1200, 34 the “implementation of Safe Systems of
Work (SSOW)” is an overall framework that describes the main
elements of a safety implementation when conducting an explosive process, including FFE. The key elements are competent staff,
adequate supervision, suitable written work instructions, appropriate work equipment, and adequate work facilities.35 The form an
SSOW takes is guided by a risk assessment that considers training
needs.36 This is sometimes referred to in shorthand as “safe place,
safe people and safe procedures.” Notably “staff must have appropriate written authorization indicating their competency to carry
out particular tasks.”37 The process would need to be detailed by
work instructions38 authorized by someone not below the rank of
Major or equivalent, with an intimate knowledge of the process,
who is themselves authorized by someone not below the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel or equivalent.39 Personnel authorized to certify
FFE are published on Unit Standing Orders, adding to transparency.40 Another means of controlling the process is the implementation of a Permit to Work system.41 Mine action does not have an
equivalent.42,43 Above all these requirements, the key document on
the subject, Defence Safety Agency 03. Ordnance Munitions and
Explosives only details certifying items FFE. It does not describe
the requirements for actually inerting items. This is because typically the process of inerting would not be done by military personal

at all, but by specialists at the Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory who possess the remote equipment required for this
form of explosive processing. It is notable that an equivalent overarching framework for conducting FFE is not
replicated in HMA.44
Figures 2 and 3. A 3D printed
replica PMA-2 anti-personnel mine.
The INERT item has been
developed for training
deminers by the Swiss
EOD Center. The training
aid has been designed to
assist detection training,
with with ability to change
the metal content in the
small red container. While
not necessarily a perfect
match for items that have
weathered over time, and not an
option for test pieces, such items are an
option for training deminers.
Figures courtesy of the author.

Should Mine Action Even Be Making Items FFE?
It could be argued that making items FFE should largely stop
within the mine action sector. There are already many items that
are claimed as FFE by many organizations, and these can be
supplemented by inert training aids that can be produced relatively
easily by means of 3D printing. If making items FFE entails a “high
degree of inherent risk,” does the risk-reward calculation make
sense anymore? After all, military organizations such as the British
Army only inert items if it is strictly necessary. The question is at
least worth asking within HMA.
Some will argue that it is justifiable to continue to inert items,
not least since in certain circumstances we will continue to neutralize and disarm items of EO regardless. For some simple AP
mines, the process of neutralization and disarming is a significant part of the inerting process anyway. At least for minefield
clearance, no longer inerting items could mean not having high
fidelity test pieces that reduce the risk of missed mines and also
more destruction of mines in situ, potentially leading to more
84
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metal contamination and false positive signals
during clearance, as well as more risk in a different sense.
In some ways inerting items of EO poses a dilemma for the
mine action sector. On the one hand, the ammunition management sector sees making items FFE as a last resort, and when it is
done, it must be justified by managers, and extensive levels of risk
management are required. The mine action sector, used to removing explosives from items such as simple AP mines in order to
make test pieces over many years, has not treated this as an explosive process but sometimes as a relatively routine field practice.
Whether mine action should strictly mirror ammunition management and apply the same level of rigor is up to those who lead the
sector. However, it is clear that when both certifying and inerting
items, the mine action sector should review its norms and consider
whether its procedures reduce risk to a level “as low as reasonably
practicable” (ALARP).

Figure 4. Mechanical Remote
Fuze Disassembly Kit used
for removing small energetic
components such as primers
in fuze rotors, GWHF
Cambodia 2014. If mine action
organizations wish to make
items of explosive ordnance
INERT, and to train suitable
staff to do so, specialist
explosive processing facilities
are required.
Image courtesy of Roger Hess.

Possible FFE Risk Management Options to Consider
Designing a detailed and heavy risk management system for
inerting and certifying FFE is an option, but any proposed system needs acceptance by the sector. The answer could be to revise
the risk management system so that it is rigorous but does not

overburden HMA field operators and recognizes the context of
HMA demining operations. Calibrating such a system appropriately will be an important part in its success or failure. Some
options to consider could include:

All organizations maintaining a central record of all items they have certified FFE globally, respectively
An approved, model-specific, energetic component check list for certifying each item of FFE held
FFE certificates listing the exact energetic components removed with date, time, and individual who
conducted the procedure recorded, along with detail of the permanent FFE marking
A surveillance regime for all accidents related to FFE
Development by each mine action organization of an overall standard operating procedure (SOP) for
assessing items as FFE
If the organization wishes to make items INERT, a list of approved technical procedures needs to be
developed for each model to be made FFE. Each procedure could have two technical approvals, one of
which could be independent of the organization
If the organization wishes to make items INERT, an FFE training record that details each specific model
an individual is authorized to make or certify as FFE that is time limited
A risk assessment specific to the model of EO, primarily applicable to making items FFE but also
relevant to certification
For making an item FFE, a Permission to Work form to be completed by an authorized senior technician
that confirms that a SSOW is in place for an explosive process to take place
If an organization wishes to make items INERT, development of advanced demilitarization training.
While these options might seem basic, if just CFFE options
were implemented in mine action, the risk of FFE-related incidents could be reduced. Even something as simple as the widespread development of SOPs for assessing items as FFE would be a

significant step forward. For organizations that wish to make items
FFE, a full review of how this can be achieved while managing risk
responsibly could be advisable.
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Figure 5 (left). An INERT MRV-U fuze complete. Note that the
fuze appearance has been altered in order to make the item
FFE. A full cut has been made above the shutter in order to
gain access to the primers, stemming, and other energetic
components. For some models, cuts on fuze bodies can
be good initial indicators as to whether energetics have
been removed and the item really is FFE. A window to
view the setback sleeve has also been added during the
inerting process. Making such an item FFE is an explosive
process that should be conducted with a high level of risk
management.
Figure courtesy of Dutch EOD Center.

Figure 6 (right). A cutaway of an FFE MRV-U fuze. The pink and
yellow elements visible in the booster section are not explosive
but an inert substitute intended to indicate the position of
some energetic elements within the fuze.
Figure courtesy of Dutch EOD Center.

FFE Risk Assessments
If organizations wish to make items INERT, pertinent written
risk assessments are an essential element of any risk management
system. The key principle for an FFE risk assessment is that it must
be specific, not generic, in that it must refer to each exact energetic
component contained within an item of EO. The risk assessment
will also detail a control measure or risk treatment for that component. That control measure will often be the same as the specific
part of the authorized process to remove that component, but the

documents are not necessarily the same. The risk assessment would
complement the inerting process but would not be a substitute for it.
It is notable that even for a relatively simple AP mine, the risk
assessment is fairly detailed. More complex items of EO will
invariably require a more detailed risk assessment, consistent
with the number of energetic components they contain, and formally approved procedures required to access and remove those
components.

FFE Procedure
The development of a technical procedure is an indispensable
element of any FFE process, both for making and certifying an item
as FFE. The procedure must not only identify each energetic component, but how it will be removed safely. NGOs such as GWHF
have developed such procedure documents.45,46 It should also be
sufficiently illustrated with technical photographs so that there is
no ambiguity as to the information it is trying to convey. The procedure complements a risk assessment for a specific item, but it is

not a substitute for one. HMA organizations should be careful that
the procedure is only ever carried out by those proven competent
to do so. A reasonable test for such competency, even for those with
advanced EOD qualifications, would be for the EOD technician to
rehearse how the procedure will be conducted without reference to
the procedure document, in order to confirm understanding, prior
to a Permission to Work being granted.

Environmental Considerations
Removal of energetics, particularly main charges, can lead to
chemical waste such as wastewater contaminated by TNT through
the process of wash out and steam out,47 or by means of hydroabrasive cutting.48,49 Mine action has only recently started to appreciate the specific pollution risks associated with EO.50,51 Especially
if large items with significant volumes of explosive fill are to be
made FFE, the risk assessment should include how any specific
environmental impact will be controlled. Various energetics have
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differing levels of toxicity. For example, Tetryl has been phased
out since the 1970s due to health effects experienced by exposed
munitions workers since the 1940s.52–54 It is still commonly found
in legacy munitions. Chronic exposure to both RDX and TNT is
known to present a degree of risk.55–57 Any inerting risk assessment
should consider the potential health effects that repeated exposure
to a given energetic could entail and identify the standard controls,
such as use of basic personal protective equipment.

FFE Records
HMA organizations should maintain a detailed record of all
FFE items they have globally. Keeping records solely at a given
location is insufficient. Such a detailed register must be more
than a list of FFE certificates with accompanying FFE codes. It
should detail when the item was originally made FFE, when it
was certified, when it was last checked, when it must be checked
again, and who has conducted all these procedures. Individual
FFE certificates should also list the energetic components
removed from an item. If an X-ray image was used to confirm

the absence of energetics within an enclosed item (e.g., a fuze),
the X-ray image should be included on the certificate, annotated
to show where components are confirmed as absent. In this way
instances of “assumed FFE,” such as fuzes that have been burnt,
can be avoided. The record must identify where the marking of
the item is positioned and whether the marking is engraved (recommended) or just indelibly marked. The security of the item
should also be detailed (i.e., is the item locked away so that it
cannot be mixed inadvertently with live ordnance).
Figure 7. An X-ray of an ADSID sensor. X-rays were
taken of the ADSID using a SAIC RTR-4 with the
XRS-3 X-ray source; 10 pulses at 25cm for all X-rays.
No detonation cord, booster, or main charge was
detected in the body. X-rays are an important means
of discovering whether items still contain energetic
components, prior to certifying them FFE.
Figure courtesy of GWHF.

Figure 8. An X-ray of a heat warhead. X-rays are an
important means of discovering whether items still contain energetic components, prior to certifying them FFE.
Figure courtesy of private individual.

Conclusion
Making and certifying items FFE are relatively unregulated
activities in HMA. It might well prove that a more stringent system
than the one briefly sketched here will be required at some point in
the future. In any case, what is outlined in this article would be a
significant increase in the current level of risk management process
for FFE in mine action and can at least serve as a starting point for
a long overdue discussion within the sector. Regardless of whether
a new way of making and certifying items as FFE is adopted, the

approach outlined in various documents concerning FFE, including IMAS 10.50, IATG 06.10, and T&EP 09.30, requires rationalization, so that at least a consistent approach can be adopted. In
addition to this, each mine action operator may wish to review
their FFE SOPs to ensure they are content with the levels of risk
management detailed. Ultimately, each mine action organization
should not only be able to identify and manage risk but actively
own the risks they choose to take.
See endnotes page 109
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